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Supply Chain Regulation in Scottish Social Care: Facilitators and Barriers 
Abstract 
Drawing on a study of a Scottish government initiative to ensure the provision of a living 
wage to social care workers, the paper sheds new light on the value of regulating domestic 
supply chains to enhance labour standards in supplier organisations, and the factors that 
facilitate and hinder such regulation. The study confirms that supply chains driven by 
monopsonistic purchasers tend to drive down employment conditions, while indicating that 
the studied initiative met with a good deal of success due to a combination of the government 
generated ‘soft’ regulation and support from care providers that reflected both value and 
pragmatic considerations. It also highlights the contradictory tensions that can arise between 
policy aspirations and business objectives and suggests that to be effective, initiatives to 
enhance labour standards in supply chains need to address adverse market dynamics. 
 
Introduction 
Over the last three decades or so the role of commercial supply relationships in shaping 
employment conditions has taken on a growing (and, in historical terms, renewed) 
significance as large public and private sector organisations have chosen to place a greater 
emphasis on management by ‘contracting’ rather than through ‘internal hierarchies’ 
(Williamson, 1975 and 1985). At the aggregate level, evidence indicates that this trend has 
made an important contribution to the deterioration in employment conditions that has 
occurred over the last thirty years. In particular, David Weil (2011) has drawn attention to 
how the shift towards externalisation has led to the creation of ‘fissured’ employment 
relationships in a number of industries with large concentrations of low paid workers (Weil, 
2011 and 2014). In these industries, powerful lead firms are noted to shape product market 
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conditions, while to a large extent being separated from the employment of the workers who 
produce the goods and services for them. Weil argues that this change has created situations 
where the direct employers of workers operate under far more competitive market conditions, 
with the result that they are confronted by pressures to reduce terms and conditions and 
incentives towards non-compliance with laid down employment standards. Furthermore, and 
more relevant to the present paper, studies have similarly revealed how public sector 
procurement of services from private and voluntary sector organisations can negatively 
impact the terms and conditions of those delivering them (see e.g Cunningham and James, 
2009; Grimshaw et al., 2015; Flecker and Hermann, 2011; Hermann and Flecker, 2012). 
The coincidence between the presence of powerful supply chain ac and employment 
vulnerability has raised the issue of whether the former can be used to help combat the latter 
(James et al, 2015). This is particularly so given evidence that such actors often, to ensure 
that secured cost reductions do not cause damage to brand image, already interfere in the 
internal management of supplier organisations, most notably through the establishment of 
demanding quality standards and rigorous monitoring systems to enforce  them. Hence a key 
theme in Weil’s work is that government agencies charged with securing compliance with 
laid down labour standards should develop strategies to motivate powerful purchasers to use 
their supply chains to support supplier compliance with them. 
This advocacy of using the power of purchasers to improve labour standard compliance has 
been echoed in policy debates internationally. At the same time, and somewhat in contrast to 
the extensive literature that exists on the regulation of global supply chains, detailed studies 
of attempts to protect and/or enhance labour standards within chains domestically located in 
advanced Western economies are striking by their rarity. There is consequently a dearth of 
empirical evidence on the factors which influence, both positively and negatively, the 
outcomes of such initiatives (James et al, 2015). Indeed, as Grimshaw et al noted in their 
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recent study of client-supplier relations in the contract cleaning sector, there is a need more 
generally for studies that focus attention on how the roles of supply chain actors’ ‘as market-
makers interact with their capacity and willingness to enact institutional rules that impose 
social obligations’ (Grimshaw et al, 2019: 91).  
The present paper addresses this lack of knowledge in the current literature. It does so by 
drawing on a study focussed on the implementation of a Scottish government policy aimed at 
ensuring the payment of the Scottish Living Wage (SLW) to  those delivering adult social 
care services on behalf of local authorities. More specifically, the paper uses these findings to 
explore three questions: (a) how far the policy had secured the payment of the SLW to adult 
care workers, (b) what factors facilitated and hindered the policy’s implementation; and (c) to 
what extent these findings support existing (limited) evidence relating to the regulation of 
labour conditions in domestic supply chains. 
To anticipate what follows, the obtained findings confirm how purchaser-provider 
relationships can set in train a downward spiral in labour conditions where power is 
asymmetrically weighted in favour of the former. They further though lend weight to the 
view that domestic supply chains can be used to have the opposite effect, while indicating 
that their potential in this regard is contingently shaped. More specifically, in the case of the 
Scottish SLW policy, the findings highlight how a combination of governmental ‘soft’ 
regulation and support from service providers on both value and pragmatic grounds 
contributed to a relatively successful implementation. In addition, by raising doubts about the 
policy’s longer-term sustainability, they reinforce the argument that initiatives to enhance 
labour standards in supply chains are most likely to meet with success if they incorporate 




The analysis proceeds through four stages. First, comes a two-part literature. The first part of 
this examines what current evidence tells us about the potential value of supply chain 
regulation and the main factors that influence its impact. The second then provides an outline 
of the background to, and nature of, the Scottish government’s SLW policy. Following this, 
the study’s methodology and findings are detailed. Finally, a discussion section explores the 
implications of these findings for future policy. 
Engendering labour standard compliance in supply chains  
Forms of legally backed supply chain regulation have long existed in Britain, dating back at 
least to the adoption of the first Fair Wages Resolution in the nineteenth century. More 
recently, section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2014 imposes obligations on relevant 
commercial organisations to produce a modern slavery and human trafficking statement each 
financial year that sets out what they are doing to ensure that such slavery is not occurring in 
their supply chains. In addition, the Director of Labour Market Enforcement in his 2018 
strategy recommended the adoption of measures under which ‘the brand name (at the top of 
the chain) bears joint responsibility for any non-compliance found further down its own 
supply chain’ and provisions to enable the temporary embargo of ‘hot goods’ produced in 
supply chains marked by non-compliance (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy, 2018).1 Subsequently, the government has recently consulted about the desirability 
of introducing legislative provisions to implement these proposals (Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2019). These British developments have, in turn, taken place 
against the backcloth of similar discussions and initiatives internationally (see e.g. Johnstone 
and Stewart, 2015; Weil, 2015). 
Such discussions and actions have been occurring against the background of some limited 
evidence of the benefits that can flow from domestic, national, initiatives aimed at exerting 
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pressure on powerful supply chain actors to influence labour conditions in supplier 
organisations. In Britain, for example, studies have highlighted how regulatory pressures and 
provisions have supported the achievement of good safety performances on major 
construction projects through the effective management of subcontracting (James et al, 2014; 
Deakin and Koukiadaki, 2009). In a similar vein, the Work and Hours Division of the U.S 
Department of Labour has successfully used ‘hot goods’ provisions in the Fair Labor 
Standard Act to improve minimum wage compliance among apparel contractors in Southern 
California (Weil, 2005) and New York (Weil and Mallo, 2007). 
The fact remains, however, that the current evidence base remains relatively limited 
regarding the outcomes of such initiatives and the factors that facilitate and hinder their 
operation. Some more comprehensive, but tentative, insights into these issues is though 
arguably provided by the much more extensive literature relating to the voluntary regulation 
of labour standards within global supply chains.  
Overall, this broader literature paints, at best, a mixed picture and, at worst, a disappointing 
one concerning the use of supply chains to enhance labour standards. For example, with 
regard to the apparel sector, it has been argued that ‘private compliance programs appear 
largely unable to deliver on their promise of sustained improvements in labor standards’ 
(Locke, 2013: 20).  A variety of explanations have been put forward to explain this situation. 
These point to the influence of a range of contextual and structural factors (Trubek and 
Trubek, 2007; Bartley, 2011) that broadly fall into three categories (James et al, 2019). The 
first of these emphasises the lack of support that voluntary supply chain initiatives receive 
from surrounding state-based legal regulation (Locke et al, 2013; Toffel et al, 2015). The 
second draws attention, more widely, to how compliance with initiatives is shaped, both 
positively and negatively, by a range of non-legal factors, such as the extent of pressures 
emanating from consumers and other social bodies, and the adequacy of mechanisms in place 
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within initiatives to monitor and secure compliance with laid down requirements (see e.g. 
O’Rouke, 2003; Vogel, 2008; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Locke, 2013; Reinecke and 
Donaghey, 2015)2. Meanwhile, the third stresses the failure of initiatives to support the 
reconfiguring of the market dynamics embedded in supply chains that exert contradictory 
downward pressures on labour costs (Anner et al, 2013).   
At the same time, the global supply chain literature highlights that the capacity to influence 
labour standards varies between issues: more positive effects, for example, being identified in 
relation to health and safety related requirements than with regard to less tangible and easily 
monitored ones focussed on issues like freedom of association and limits on excessive 
overtime (Locke et al, 2009). It similarly highlights how the challenges facing the effective 
operation of these arrangements vary according to the nature of the supply chains concerned. 
On the basis of an analysis of cut flower and banana global supply chains, Rissgaard and 
Hammer (2011) have observed that while a highly driven chain ‘opens avenues for labour (as 
well as other social movements) to target strategic actor(s)’, ‘such leverage is more 
implausible where value chain strands are characterised by relatively loose market-based, 
trading relationships’. Meanwhile, more widely, Lakhani et al (2013), drawing on the varying 
types of global supply chains distinguished by Gereffi and colleagues (Gereffi et al, 2005), 
have developed a configurational framework in which they postulate a set of employment 
relations implications for each of them. In doing so, they similarly suggest that the influence 
of public campaigns, union strategies and multinational initiatives to improve labour 
standards will vary between different types of supply chains.  
How far these findings from global supply chain research can be extrapolated to the 
regulation of domestic-based ones in developed market economies remains something of an 
open question. So does the issue, more specifically, of their application to ones in the public 
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sector where the financial/commercial imperatives at work might be expected to be rather 
different. 
In relation to the first of these questions, Weil, a leading advocate of domestic supply chain 
chain regulation, both as an academic and, for a period, Director of the Department of 
Labor’s Work and House Division during the Obama Presidency, has usefully highlighted 
four different categories of asymmetric supply relationships that prevail in monopsonistic 
markets associated with vulnerable forms of employment (Weil, 2009) - strong buyers 
sourcing products in competitive supply chains; central production coordinators managing 
large contracting networks; small workplaces linked to large, branded, national organizations; 
and small workplaces and contractors linked together by common purchasers. In doing so, he 
has convincingly argued, in a clear echo of the global supply chain literature, that 
‘Understanding how industry structures relate to the creation of vulnerable work….provides 
insight into how those same dynamics could be used as a regulatory mechanism to bring 
systemic compliance to an entire industry rather than on an employer-by-employer basis’ 
(Weil, 2009: 421).   
More narrowly, the studies referred to earlier relating to large construction projects in Britain 
and minimum wage compliance in the United States also point to the relevance of central 
strands of argument found in the global supply chain literature. The latter, for example, not 
only demonstrates the role of supportive legal provisions but how the impact of the studied 
‘hot goods’ policies was influenced by the requirement that manufacturers facing product 
embargos commit to monitor future compliance of suppliers and to remediate any violations 
so identified (Weil and Mallo, 2007). Meanwhile, in the former British case, the researchers 
concluded that the impressive health and safety performances achieved on the two major 
building projects studied stemmed from the mutual interplay of several factors (James et al, 
2014). These included the way in which the regulator had, in conjunction with major firms 
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and against the background of relevant legal requirements, established an understanding of 
what constituted ‘best practice’ in the management of large construction projects. They also 
included how this understanding had shaped major contractor perceptions of the reputational 
risks associated with projects and the actions they had taken to minimise them by imposing 
controls over the selection, monitoring and more general management of sub-contractors.  
There are consequently grounds to believe that the constellation of factors influencing the 
effectiveness of attempts to regulate domestic supply chains are likely to broadly reflect those 
that have been found to influence the impact of their global counterparts. There are also 
though grounds for arguing that the use of supply chains to protect and enhance labour 
standards is likely easier at a domestic rather global level (Gibbons, 1998). Thus, such chains 
will tend to embody fewer tiers and operate against the backcloth of essentially common 
social and economic contexts. In addition, as the opening paragraph of this review 
highlighted, it is potentially feasible to develop legally based requirements on the 
management of supply chains. The scale of these advantages must not, however, be 
overstated, as the poor employment practices recently found in garment factories supplying a 
major British fashion brand in the city of Leicester graphically illustrate3.  
Care also needs to be exercised in advancing the view that the dynamics surrounding attempts 
to regulate domestic chains are likely to be fundamentally different in the case of outsourcing 
by public sector organisations because they are less driven by financial considerations and 
more by social values and objectives. As with inter-organisational trading relations in 
general, the procurement behaviour of public sector bodies will be influenced by surrounding 
social and economic contexts. This is illustrated clearly by a comparative analysis of the 
public service outsourcing undertaken by local authorities in five countries which revealed 
‘country-specific interconnections between labour market factors and outsourcing’ 
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(Grimshaw et al; 2015: 296). However, while clearly such contexts will exhibit differences to 
those of private organisations, this does not mean that the financial drivers of outsourcing 
will necessarily be fundamentally different. For example, in a recent study of the relations 
subsisting between contract cleaning companies and their public and private sector clients it 
was found that both types of client injected price competition into tenders for service and 
enacted continuous cost-reducing pressures (Grimshaw et al, 2019: 90). Findings that can be 
seen to point to the wider applicability of an argument advanced by Bélanger and Edwards in 
relation to public sector nursing work that, as a result of ‘budgetary constraints and the 
rhetoric of rationalization and consumerism’, the need for efficiency ‘is no different in kind 
from that in a private sector organization’ (Bélanger and Edwards, 2013: 445). 
In short, while limited research has explored the impact of domestic based supply chain 
initiatives focussed on improving compliance with laid down employment standards, there 
are grounds to believe that they can generate positive results. However, evidence in the more 
extensive literature on global supply chains points to the likely contingent nature of their 
effects. In particular, there are grounds to believe that their viability and impact will be 
influenced by their subject foci and the structure of the supply chains concerned, and that 
their effectiveness will be further influenced by important features of their design. Most 
notably, the extent to which they are backed by supporting legal requirements, the presence 
of facilitating non-legal factors, including pressures emanating from consumers and the 
arrangements put in place to monitor and secure compliance with laid down requirements; 
and the extent to which problematic product market dynamics are addressed. 
In what follows light will be shed on the applicability of these conclusions to the policy of 
paying the SLW to adult social care workers. As a result, new light will also be shed on their 
applicability to public service, rather than private sector, supply chains operating in an 
outsourcing context marked by monopsonistic purchasers.   
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Regulating adult social care pay 
Adult social care services in Scotland are delivered directly by local authorities and by 
independent subcontracted organisations from the private and non-profit sectors (Crouch, 
2011; Martin, 2011). As a result of processes of marketization over the past four decades, 
the majority of residential and domiciliary care is now, however, outsourced by local 
authorities to organisations in the latter sectors (Hughes et al, 2009). This pattern of delivery 
means that two distinct systems exist for determining the terms and conditions of social care 
staff. Those still employed by local authorities are covered by long-established national 
collective bargaining arrangements. For others pay and conditions are set at the enterprise 
level, either through local negotiations with unions or unilaterally by management.  
Studies indicate that local authorities occupy monopsonistic market positions and 
consequently largely set the price for care to the detriment of providers (Rubery and Urwin, 
2011). Research further shows that the increasing reliance placed on commissioning care 
from external providers through competitive tendering has coincided with the ongoing 
driving down of the terms and conditions of care staff working for them, with the result that 
a growing gap has developed with those of staff who continue to be employed by local 
authorities (Cunningham and James, 2014; Cunningham and James, 2017). Market forces 
and austerity have, therefore, combined to allow local authorities, in shifting from the direct 
delivery to the commissioning of services, to cut costs in a way that would almost certainly 
not have been possible with their own internal workforces given the presence of collectively 
bargained terms and conditions of employment.  
This process of employment degradation, has led to growing concerns about the ability of 
providers to maintain service quality in the face of recruitment and retention problems, 
rising workloads and growing staff discontent (Cunningham and James, 2017; Rubery et al, 
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2011; Mulholland, Fawcett and Granville 2016). A study by the Office of the Chief Social 
Work Adviser (Mulholland, et al 2016), for example, found that the majority of providers 
had regularly or occasionally experienced problems in the recruitment of care and support 
workers, and believed these difficulties would only intensify in the future. The report further 
identified low pay as the main reason why organisations were unable to recruit and retain 
workers, with other contributory factors being the continuing shortfall in local authority 
funding, competition with other sectors for the same labour and increasing anti-social hours 
driven by the flexibility demanded from workers (Mulholland et al, 2016). These pressures 
on pay and recruitment were further noted to be occurring at a time of increasing demands 
on the skills of the workforce through the government’s system of Scottish Vocational 
Qualifications (Gospal and Lewis, 2011), the promulgation of ‘fitness to practice’ standards 
(SSSC, 2017) and policy developments in Scotland such as the personalisation of social care 
and health and social care integration. 
 
The Scottish government has long exhibited an interest in utilising public procurement to 
advance social objectives. In 2014 it unsuccessfully attempted to add the living wage as a 
condition in all government contracts via the Procurement Reform Act Scotland (Prowse 
and Fell, 2016). More widely, under its ‘Fair Work’ principles and guidance, public 
commissioning authorities are expected to consider how bidders approach the reward, 
recognition, training and supervision of staff (Cunningham et al, 2018). These initiatives, 
however, have occurred against the backcloth of employment law remaining an issue within 
the prerogative of the UK government, with the result that the Scottish government does not 




Nevertheless, in order to address these recruitment and retention problems, in February 
2016 the Scottish government and the Confederation of Scottish Local Authorities 
(COSLA) jointly agreed that front-line care staff working on publicly funded adult social 
care should be paid at a minimum the Scottish Living Wage (SLW), then set at £8.25 per 
hour, with effect from 1 October of that year.4 To support the achievement of this ‘soft 
regulation’ measure the government allocated funding to local health and social care 
partnerships that was to be transferred onwards via local authorities to care 
providers/employers. This transfer would occur through the re-negotiation of contract 
prices, fees and hourly rates paid for service delivery, thus enabling providers to increase 
staff pay in line with the commitment. When the SLW rate was increased in November 
2016, Scottish Government and COSLA similarly identified to meet this increase.  
 
To support the introduction of the SLW policy, implementation guidance for health and 
social care partnerships and providers was drafted and issued by an Implementation Group 
comprising provider representative organisations, such as Scottish Care and the Coalition of 
Care and Support Providers Scotland (CCPS) and trades unions. Among other things, this 
guidance made clear that: providers were expected to make a contribution towards the costs 
of the Living Wage commitment; contracting authorities could not under EU law make the 
payment of the SLW a mandatory element of the competitive tendering process but could 
take account of a bidders approach to the government’s fair work practices as they are 
supported by statutory guidance; and local government commissioners were responsible for 
ensuring that the commitment to the living wage was delivered through local contracts and 
agreements. More widely, the guidance stated that ‘Local authorities will need to engage 
care providers in negotiations to reach a voluntary agreement and this will be facilitated by a 
funding process that is fair, transparent and collaborative, and achieve ‘buy-in from 
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providers’. It went on to detail four possible ways of funding providers (via their contracted 
hourly rates) to pay the living wage to adult social care staff:  
 
• Applying a percentage increase across the board 
• Applying a differing percentage increase per provider, through individual negotiation 
based on their particular costs 
• Setting a standard rate for each local authority within which the relevant hourly rate 
is payable 
• Setting a suite of [such] rates 
In short, the Scottish Government’s SLW policy offered a very apt setting to add to the 
existing literature on the employment-related effects of supply chain dynamics through an 
exploration of the following questions:  
(a) how far the policy had secured the payment of the SLW to adult care workers;  
(b) what factors had acted to facilitate and hinder the policy’s implementation; and 
(c) to what extent these findings support existing (limited) evidence relating to the 
regulation of labour conditions in domestic supply chains. 
Methodology 
The study drawn upon in this paper explored, as part of a wider research project, a range of 
issues relating to the implementation of the Scottish Government’s SLW policy. These issues 
included: the experiences of providers and commissioning authorities in implementing the 
commitment to pay the living wage; the application and usefulness of the guidance issued to 
support this commitment’s operationalisation; the enablers and barriers to successful 
implementation; and how the implementation process could be improved in the future. This 
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study employed an inductive, qualitative approach to gather data on the above issues given 
its capacity to provide rich insights into respondents’ perspectives on them.  
The primary source of data collection was interviews with key informants who either had 
responsibilities for ensuring that the SLW policy commitment was delivered to adult social 
care staff on the front-line or were involved in designing the Implementation Guidance. 
Interviewees were therefore selected via a purposive sampling strategy (Patton, 2002) that 
also sought to ensure that those selected from local authorities and care providers varied in 
terms of such factors as organizational size, sector, and location of care service provision. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the directors and HR managers of 11 
voluntary and two independent sector providers to explore the facilitators and barriers they 
faced in operationalising the SLW and its impact on employment conditions (e.g. timing of 
pay settlements and the impact on differentials, terms and conditions, recruitment and 
retention, and the provision of services). Two focus groups were also held with four and two 
voluntary sector providers respectively to assess the extent of shared or divergent views 
regarding experiences with implementing the living wage. The experiences reported through 
these essentially echoed those reported during the semi-structured interviews and so are not 
drawn upon in what follows.  
Further interviews were conducted with relevant personnel in five local authorities, including  
Chief Officers, members of Integrated Joint Boards, and procurement and finance managers 
responsible for contracting and commissioning social care services in their local authority. 
These local authorities were purposively selected according to a stratified sampling approach 
to capture the variety of urban, rural, and semi-rural settings in which care is delivered across 
Scotland. Finally, further confirmatory interviews were undertaken with civil servants, 
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representatives from COSLA, lead bodies of employers (CCPS and Scottish Care) and a 
senior trade union representative that aimed at capturing their experiences as members of the 
Implementation Group and exploring the operational and wider regulatory and policy 
contexts of the SLW policy.5  
In total, as shown in Table 1 below, data were collected through a combination of interviews 
and focus groups with 36 respondents representing a range of voices from the main actors 
involved in the implementation of the Scottish government’s SLW policy.  
Table 1: Profile of respondents  
Respondents Number 
Voluntary sector providers  11 (15 respondents) 
Independent sector providers 2 
Focus group of voluntary sector providers 2 (6 respondents) 
Representatives of lead employer bodies 2 
Union officials 1 
Contracting and commissioning authorities 5 (7 respondents) 
Civil servants 2 (3 respondents) 
 
The interviews were all digitally recorded, averaging 50 minutes in length, and transcribed 
verbatim with any identifying information removed to preserve confidentiality. All four 
members of the research team analysed the interview transcripts independently. The 
research team began by coding the interviews for instances where respondents expressed 
views about the enablers and barriers to implementation, changing roles and influence in 
relation to pay determination and the ongoing impact of SLW implementation on 
16 
 
employment and market relations in social care. A broad list of descriptive codes emerged 
from openly coding the data and these were labelled or given phrasal descriptors from the 
respondents where possible (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013). These codes were first 
grouped according to similarities and differences across the two provider groups (voluntary 
sector vs independent providers). These insights were then contrasted with the 
commonalities and dissimilarities arising from local authority respondents, central 
government officials and union and employer lead body representatives. Data analysis 
progressed by abstracting from these patterns to identify central emergent themes. Iterating 
back and forth between the data and literature, these themes were then analysed according to 
the extent to which they confirmed or challenged the existing evidence relating to the 
regulation of labour conditions in domestic supply chains.  
Since adequacy is critical in presenting the experiences of research participants (Gioia et al. 
2013), the research team sought to validate the emergent themes through respondent 
validation when presenting initial findings back to the key informant interviewees. 
Meanwhile, informant confidentiality and accurate record keeping during all phases of the 
research process additionally ensured the dependability of findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Finally, verbatim transcription of interviews further helped to ensure the confirmability of 
the findings, mitigating the bias of the researchers’ personal values or theoretical 
inclinations (Shah & Corley, 2006).  
Findings 
To obtain a rounded picture of both the impact of the Scottish government’s SLW policy and 
the factors influencing, both positively and negatively, its implementation, attention below is 
first focussed on exploring how local authorities implemented the government’s policy and 
then on the experiences of service providers. In the case of the former, particular attention is 
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paid to the way in which local authorities approached the policy’s implementation in terms of 
setting hourly contract prices, engaging providers in discussions over these, and enforcing 
provider compliance with the policy. In the case of the latter, the focus is placed on provider 
experiences and responses to the policies and actions of local authority commissioners.  
The living wage and local authorities 
The funding provided by government to support the implementation of the SLW was 
negotiated with COSLA, apparently with no detailed analysis of the amount really needed to 
fund the provision of the living wage to all frontline adult social care workers. It was then 
distributed using the normal formula for disbursing central government funds to local 
government. As a result, as a number of respondents pointed out, it took no explicit account 
of the varying extent to which authorities had outsourced services and hence the scale of the 
costs they might face. On top of this, as already noted, from the outset it was stated that 
providers would have to contribute themselves to the costs involved. These features 
consequently meant that the funding provided was less than that required to implement the 
government’s policy and that the extent to which this was the case was likely to vary 
considerably among different authorities. 
In this context, it was perhaps no surprise that providers reported considerable variation in 
how authorities pursued the policy’s implementation and with what degree of generosity. 
This variation, for example, led one respondent from the Integrated Joint Board, the body 
leading the Health and Social Care Partnerships, to observe that there were ’32 local 
authorities trying to implement it in 32 different ways’. In effect therefore authorities made 
use, in varying ways, of each of the four options put forward in the joint implementation 
guidance. In particular, approaches included some authorities straightforwardly giving a 
percentage uplift on hourly rates to all provider and others engaging in lengthy and highly 
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detailed individual negotiations with providers. Furthermore, in some cases, this individual 
approach was also pursued in a narrow way in that authority’s attention was focussed 
exclusively on providing support to providers who were currently paying staff below the 
SLW. Thereby excluding better paying ones, an approach that did not go down well with the 
providers concerned since it was perceived as penalising organisations that had ‘tried to do 
right’ by their staff. 
These variations reflected a combination of individual preferences and differences in the 
financial positions of authorities, as well as the priority accorded to social care vis a vis other 
demands on resources. They also reflected differences in the extent to which commissioning 
authorities took the view that some of the costs of uplifting hourly rates of pay to staff should 
be covered by efficiency savings obtained by providers through such means as merging back 
office functions, stripping out layers of management, and transferring resources to the front 
line, as the following quote from a local authority interviewee shows: 
‘….we would also start off [discussions] with providers by saying to them, you know, what 
can we do to try and make things easier for you, and how can we help with efficiencies….So 
we had all these discussions…..but they just wanted more money. Let’s not do things more 
efficiently, let’s just, give us more money. And we can’t’ 
The reference in the above quote to ‘discussions’ should not, however, give the impression 
that how the payment of the living wage was to be incorporated into hourly contract rates was 
invariably a subject of discussion. In fact, the transparency surrounding the setting of these 
rates varied considerably. At one extreme, there were authorities that consulted with 
providers on an individual and/or collective basis, with some of these being praised for their 
open and transparent processes. At the other, were ones that reportedly imposed methods of 
paying the SLW with limited or no consultation and hence on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis. 
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More generally, it was far from clear how far authorities sought to base their hourly contract 
prices on a detailed understanding of those needed to cover the direct and indirect costs of 
providers, rather than perceptions of what they could afford. Indeed, a common perception of 
provider interviewees was that in general those commissioning services had limited 
appreciation of the real costs of providing care. 
A further source of variation among commissioning authorities related to the actions they 
took to commit providers to paying the SLW and to monitor their payment of it. Although the 
SLW is not a binding contractual requirement and respondents were aware that it could not 
be made a legal requirement, some contracting authorities reported giving priority to 
providers who paid it. For example, some local authorities specified the payment of the SLW 
as desirable, noting that should a provider no longer pay it, then it might not qualify to 
receive further contracts. Regarding the monitoring of provider compliance, practices here 
also varied, with some authorities effectively doing nothing and others monitoring payment 
through visits by quality assurance officers and spot checks. Against this backcloth, however, 
little evidence was obtained of providers failing to pay the SLW to staff – only two cases, 
both from the private sector, being reported by those interviewed from local authorities. Nor, 
relatedly was much evidence obtained of providers offsetting the costs of the SLW by 
reducing other terms and conditions. It needs to be borne in mind here, however, that many of 
these had, as discussed earlier, been already reduced during the gradual degradation of 
employment conditions that has occurred in the sector over the last four decades and 
references were made to increases in work intensification and the taking of steps to merge 
back office functions and strip out layers of management. In addition, as the following quote 
illustrates, future such changes were not ruled out by all provider respondents: 
‘We have looked at that and we’ve thought about it. You don’t get a lot of add on’s, so the big 
ones for us are maternity pay, occupational sick pay and our holidays, but we haven’t tried to 
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cut any of them to move forward. I can’t deny it’s a discussion that we had, but at the moment 
we’ve not had to do it’  
Finally, there were signs that the way in which the SLW policy was acting to level up pay 
rates across the sector was starting to affect the commissioning strategies of local authorities 
and so the nature of competition in the social care market. Thus, a move towards 
standardising hourly rates, thereby shifting the focus of tendering more on to the issue of 
quality rather than cost, was frequently mentioned in interviews. Several authorities, for 
example, mentioned the establishment of standard hourly rates: although those explicitly 
mentioned varied between £15.10 and £16.20. Others reported that they planned to move 
from individual negotiations with providers to a two-tiered framework for all care at home to 
minimise variations in rates. 
Provider experiences and responses 
Those interviewed from providers were universally supportive of the government’s policy in 
principle, viewing it as a long overdue initiative to address the poor pay of those working in 
social care. At the same time, they expressed many frustrations about the policy’s 
operationalisation and effects. 
A key complaint voiced by those working in organisations that were delivering services for a 
number of local authorities was the difficulties that arose in coping with the differing 
approaches that were being adopted towards the funding of SLW related rate increases and 
the timescales on which decisions on these were being made. Attention, for example, was 
drawn to the challenges of retaining common pay structures for all staff. Reference was also 
made to the issue of when it was financially viable and sensible to increase pay in line with 
the SLW given that local authorities varied considerably in terms of when they made 
decisions regarding (a) how they were going to approach the implementation of the SLW and 
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(b) when providers were informed of what, if any, support, they were to be given to enable 
them to pay it. A number of the interviewees noted in this regard that they could not pay the 
SLW until they been fully paid by funders or had reached a ‘critical mass’ of local authority 
funding decisions, but that this then led to tensions with staff as they were aware of their 
entitlement to an increase. The following quote usefully captures the complexity that such 
‘multi-authority’ organisations were facing: 
‘If you’re working across 12 local authorities, and one of them has decided to award three 
percent across the board, and another one is giving you nothing…and another one has 
decided that it’s horses for courses and they’ll give you a separate negotiation for each 
service and another one has decided they’ll give you 1.5 percent and another one will give 
you twenty five pence on your hourly rate, it’s just a nightmare trying to bring all that 
together’ 
Uncertainties surrounding the size and timing of increases in turn raised frequently expressed 
concerns about cash flow and financial sustainability, particularly given the arrival of any 
supportive uplifts in contract prices were often very delayed. These concerns were voiced 
across all sizes of organisations. However, they were seen to be particularly challenging for 
smaller organisations who had limited reserves and hence were unable to incur operational 
deficits.  
Where, as was mostly the case, SLW related pay increases for adult social care staff could not 
be generalised across internal pay structures, this was reported to generate further problems. 
Horizontally, it created problematic differences in pay between people carrying out equally 
valuable work, such as those engaged in supporting people coming home from hospital, 
providing frontline children services, and undertaking certain types of preventative services 
work.  Vertically meanwhile widespread worries were expressed about the impact of SLW 
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related increases on differentials, both upwards (e.g. team leaders/supervisors) and 
downwards (e.g. domestics and catering staff). Respondents were particularly exercised about 
the way in which the squeezing of differentials could exacerbate already difficult recruitment 
and retention problems with the last of these categories of staff, while also damaging morale 
within them. In relation to this, it was observed that payments from undertaking sleepovers, 
in conjunction with the new hourly rates, could remove almost all differences in overall take 
home pay: 
‘The fact that [frontline] staff do sleepover and sleepovers at quite a high rate [means 
they]…..are earning more, they’re definitely earning more than assistant managers and 
they’re near enough earning the same as team manager’     
Traditionally sleepovers have been paid in the care sector through a flat rate payment and not 
viewed as ‘working time’. Case law relating to compliance with the UK’s national minimum 
wage (NMW) now makes clear, however, that they should be treated as part of such time and 
hence be paid in line with the NMW. The Scottish government’s SLW policy left unclear 
though whether sleepovers should be paid at the level of the SLW and it appeared that local 
authorities – at least for the most part – were not providing funding on this basis and were 
increasingly refusing to pay people to sleep.  The introduction of ‘waking nights’, however, 
was noted to be increasing staffing requirements and hence costs significantly as staff were 
not be able to pick up a shift after a waking night in the same way as many have previously 
done after sleepovers. Furthermore, this loss of shifts was likely to mean staff, somewhat 
ironically, losing money, a point made by one provider interviewee in the following terms: 
‘In a few years’ time we’ll have staff who say, “I used to earn £75 a night or £85 a night for 
a sleepover, and I’m doing two of them a week, that’s £600 a month I was earning, I’m not 
earning any more’   
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When reflecting on such experiences, some interviewees raised doubts about whether their 
organisations would be able to continue to pay the SLW, with several indicating that it was 
for this reason that their organisations had not committed to being an accredited ‘Living 
Wage Employer’. More widely, interviewees frequently reported how low contract prices 
were leading to worsening relations with local authority partners, further reductions in 
sleepovers, and the closure of services. Indeed, several providers reported that they had 
already recently refused to submit a tender because the hourly rate was too low, while others 
had apparently threatened to withdraw from services unless additional funding was made 
available. One provider, when talking about maintaining wage rates at the SLW level, for 
example, observed that: 
‘It’ll push some services if we don’t get increases to closure. Because services are teetering 
on a knife edge’ 
Discussion     
This paper has drawn on a study of the implementation of a Scottish government policy of 
paying the SLW to adult social care workers in order to address the currently sparse literature 
on initiatives aimed at improving labour conditions within domestic supply chains. More 
specifically, it has sought to use the findings from the study to address three questions: (a) 
how far the policy had secured the payment of the SLW to adult care workers and (b) what 
factors had acted to facilitate and hinder the policy’s implementation; and (c) to what extent 
these findings support existing (limited) evidence relating to the regulation of labour 
conditions in domestic supply chains. 
In relation to the first of these questions, the study’s findings not only lend support to the 
rationale for attempting to use the trading dynamics within supply chains to protect and 
enhance labour standards but also to the claimed beneficial effects of doing so. Both the 
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background to the Scottish government’s SLW policy and the findings obtained with regard 
to its implementation can be seen to provide further confirmation of how processes of 
outsourcing, and the supply chain dynamics they encompass, can detrimentally impact on the 
terms and conditions of staff working within supplier organisations (see e.g James et al, 2015; 
Cunningham et al, 2013; Wright and Lund, 2003; James et al, 2007; James and Lloyd, 2008; 
Rubery et al, 2003). Indeed, as was shown, it was to counter such effects, and more 
particularly their adverse consequences for the recruitment and retention of adult social care 
staff, that the policy was developed. Furthermore, an important feature of the study’s findings 
was that providers, despite being under no explicit contractual obligations to pay the SLW, 
had generally responded positively to the Scottish government’s policy: a positive response 
that, however, existed alongside concerns among them about their longer-term ability to 
continue to pay staff in line with it. 
These somewhat contradictory findings reflected the influence of a combination of 
facilitating and hindering factors that simultaneously engendered support for the policy while 
rendering compliance with it challenging. On the positive side, the status of the SLW policy 
as a form of government authored ‘soft regulation’, the funding support some providers 
received to pay the SLW to frontline adult care workers and the variety of informal pressures 
exerted by local authority on providers had all clearly encouraged compliance with the 
policy. The fact that providers were invariably supportive, both on value and pragmatic 
recruitment and retention grounds, can also be seen to have supported of the policy’s 
effective implementation, even when local authorities were commonly failing to sufficiently 
compensate them for the additional costs arising from paying the SLW. Meanwhile, features 
of the contracting marketplace providers were operating in, and in particular, the influence 
that commissioning local authorities, more generally, exerted over it, largely accounted for 
the doubts expressed regarding ongoing compliance with the SLW policy. 
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What emerged strongly from the obtained findings was how the funding resources and 
priorities of local authorities, as a result of the monopsonistic nature of the social care market, 
fundamentally shaped the dynamics of the social care contracting marketplace (Cunningham 
and James, 2104; Cunningham and James, 2017). This is not to say that these authorities were 
all powerful – the way in which some providers had withdrawn from services, or refused to 
tender for them, demonstrates this. It is instead to observe that the decisions such authorities 
took, often unilaterally, regarding the implementation of the government’s SLW policy did 
reverberate on key elements of staff management and relations within provider organisations 
that in turn impacted more widely on staff motivation and morale, as well as their recruitment 
and retention. These included the ability of providers to maintain integrated pay structures, 
the differentials existing between different categories of staff, the way in which night-time 
care was organised, and the balance between frontline and back office staffing. They also 
included, more fundamentally, the financial challenges that providers reported facing in 
paying the SLW against the background of ongoing local authority attempts to cut contract 
prices: a finding that therefore echoed recent evidence of a growing incidence of voluntary 
sector providers either handing back contracts, or not tendering for them, on the grounds that 
they are not financially viable (Cunningham et al, 2019). 
The findings can be seen to extend current knowledge on the regulation of domestic supply 
chains in several important respects. 
Existing evidence regarding the use of both domestic and global supply chains to protect and 
enhance labour standards points to the capacity of state based legal regulation to influence 
labour standards in supply chains in respect of issues such as pay and health and safety (see 
e.g. James et al, 2014; Weil and Mallo, 2007). The present study usefully extends this 
evidence by showing that, in the case of domestic supply chains, government sponsored ‘soft 
regulation’ can also be influential in this regard, at least in a public sector context and where 
26 
 
its focus resonates with the values and more pragmatic business concerns of those in supplier 
organisations. In doing so, the study highlights how the challenges of monitoring and 
enforcing compliance with laid down supply chain requirements are likely to be contextually 
variable and also, perhaps, generally lower than is the case of more complex global supply 
chains (Locke, 2013).6  
The study’s findings also shed valuable new light on three other related themes within the 
existing literature. In highlighting the monopsonistic market positions occupied by local 
authority commissioners and the implications this had for the working conditions of care 
staff, the study offered further confirmation of the association between such market power 
and the existence of asymmetric supply relationships that generate forms of employment 
vulnerability (Weil, 2009). Secondly, in offering such confirmation, the study adds weight to 
the view that to be effective attempts at supply chain regulation need to take account of the 
market dynamics embedded in them (Weil, 2011) and seek to reconfigure them (Anner et al, 
2013). Thirdly, it similarly offers support for analyses suggesting that such regulation is 
particularly viable in the case of ‘highly driven’ supply relationships (Risgaard and Hammer, 
2011; Lakhani et al, 2013) 
Finally, while confirming, in line with the findings of Grimshaw et al (2019), that care should 
be taken not to exaggerate the differences between public and private sector contracting 
environments, the present study also points to how the contracting dynamics observed could 
not be fully understood without taking into account how the pricing policies of local authority 
commissioner reflected the influence of central government funding and the way in which, 
more particularly, the post-2010 austerity policies of the UK government had exerted a 
profound downward pressure on the funding of commissioned social care services, as well as 
the employment conditions of staff (Rubery et al, 2011). It consequently additionally 
highlights how in public sector contexts required processes of market reconfiguration are 
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likely to raise broader, and difficult, political issues that may be difficult to adequately 
resolve.   
 
Conclusion 
The paper has sought to address the lack of knowledge that currently exists on attempts to 
regulate domestic supply chains to protect and enhance labour standards in supplier 
organisations. It has done so by drawing on the findings of a study focussed on the 
implementation of a Scottish government policy aimed at ensuring the payment of a living 
wage to workers engaged on the delivery of adult social care services on behalf of local 
authorities. The findings are seen to reinforce existing arguments pointing to the potential 
value of such regulation and the factors that both support and hinder its implementation. 
The study has offered further confirmation that supply chains driven by monopsonistic 
purchasers tend to drive down employment conditions in supplier organisations while 
showing that this applies in public as well as private sector contexts. Its findings further 
indicate that forms of soft regulation can potentially work in such contexts, particularly in 
ones where there is support for them on pragmatic and/or value grounds. In doing so, they 
also suggest that the challenges of monitoring and enforcing compliance with supply chain 
initiatives are consequently likely to vary (while being generally easier in domestic rather 
than global ones).  The findings have further pointed to the contradictory tensions that can 
arise between policy aspirations, on the one hand, and business objectives relating to cost and 
price reductions, on the other. Consequently, they are additionally seen to add weight to the 
argument that to be effective initiatives to enhance labour standards in supply chains need to 
address the product market dynamics that render current ones problematic. 
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It needs, however, to also be noted that the study’s insights into the role and nature of 
domestic supply chain regulation are subject to limitations. These most notably stem from its 
exclusive focus on a single public sector contracting market marked by ‘highly driven’ 
purchaser-provider relations and in which legal regulation was not possible. Further research 
could therefore be usefully undertaken to address these limitations of focus and thereby 
explore the wider generalisability of the findings obtained in the present study.   
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Notes 
1 In the first instance, it is proposed that such joint responsibility would not be established in ‘a strict legal 
sense’ but operate through the public naming of the head of a supply chain where non-compliance was 
occurring. 
2 A variety of problems surrounding the use of audit systems to monitor compliance have been identified, 
including the range of skills required of auditors, the challenges arising from ensuring that compliance is 
ongoing against the backcloth of continually changing conditions, the reliability of the information provided to 
auditors and, more generally, the resources that multinational purchasers are willing to commit to them (see 
e.g. Locke et al, 2009). 
3 See https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/labour-rights-violations-in-leicester-garment-
factories-reflect-industry-norms 
4 The SLW is set by the Living Wage Foundation and is based on the annual calculation of a Minimum Income 
Standard that is set in relation to the cost of living (Prowse et al, 2017; Cunningham et al, 2018). At the time of 
writing, the wage was set at £9 per hour. 
5 Access to some of those interviewed was valuably aided by staff from CCPS. 
6 A further tricky issue in this area is of course that local authorities, as service commissioners and clients, do 
not provide an independent source of such oversight (see Grimshaw et al, 2018). The logic that has led 
multinationals to appoint third party auditors to monitor compliance with global supply chain initiatives would 
therefore seem equally applicable to them (Locke, 2013).  
                                                          
